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The different rules of care that a carrier of

passengers owes to those passengers w'hom it

to limit

gratuitously, and its right

carries

that care by an

express contract with the passenger is of compal-a-

tively recent origin and development.

The

to

44e

attention of the courts was first called o+

this questiog less

2

than half a century

ago.

During the interval that has since elapsed the ques-

tion has been litigated in all its different phases,

and numerous contradictory decisions rendered.

It would be useless to try to reconcile these

decisions, as they are in many cases arbitrary, and

ignore prior decisions that have been made in the

same jurisdiction.

In some states

it has been held that a carrier

of passengers owes the same degree of care to free

passengers as he does to those that pay fare.

While in other states a different rule has been fol-

lowed, namely, that a carrier of gratuitous passen-

And again

gers is only bound to use slight care.

there is a dispute as to what extent a carrier can

limit his liability by express contract.

The leading case in this Country on the subject,

and in the absence of contrn ct exempting the carrier

from liability, is the case of Philadelphia Reading

Railw.,ay Company vs.

Derby,

14 Howard,

428.

In

this

case Derby, the plaintiff, was a stockholder in the

defendant

company, and on the invitation of its

president was riding in , special car provided by

the company, a collision took place by the negli-

company

gence of the agents of te

allowinm a

in

freight train to stand on the tv°ack when they had

orders to keep the track clear, and in

,Iiich the

plaintiff was injured, and he brought action for'

damage s.

defend the suit

The company solight to

ground that

ger.

.as a

the plaintiff

The court held,

that

on the

gratuitous passen-

it was the duty of the

carrier to transport the passenger safely, and that

this duty did not arise from the compensation paid

for the service;

that this duty is imposed by lai

even when the service

is

gratuitous,

and that as

the plaintiff was lawfilly on defendant's car at

the time of the injury,

the fact that he had paid

no fare did not affect his right to recover for the

injury.

The court also said:

"When carriers under-

take to convey persons by the powerful but danger-

ous agency of steam, public policy and safety re-

quire that they be held to the greatest possible

care and diligence, and whether the consideration

for such transportation be pecumiary or otherwise,

the personal safety of passengers should not be

left to the sport of chance or negligence of care-

less agents, any negligence

in such cases may well

deserve the epithet Gross!"

The doctrine laid down in the Derby case was

reaffirmed in the case of Steamboit New World vs.

King,

16 Howa-rd 260.

King was a passenger on

board a steamer on avoyage

from Sacramento

to SanT'ran-

cisco, and was injured by the exploding of a boiler

flue caused by the negligence of the agents of the

c omp any.

It

seems that

-<ing had formerly been em-

ployed as a waiter on board this boat, and just be-

fore she sailed from Sacramento, he applied to the

master for a free passage to San Francisco which %7as

granted him and he came on board.

The company was held liable for the injury,

and the court said:

"We desire to be understood to

reaffirm the doctrine of the Derby case, as rest-

ing not only on public policy, but on sound princi-

pies of law.'

Thus we see

that in the absence of

contract exe-qpti-n- the carrier from liability for

injuries to a gratuitous passenger that he

is still

liable the same as though faro had been paid.

This is well settled both in England and in this

Country, although there are some contrary decis-

ions.

Railroad companies are incorpora.ted,

at least,

from considerations of public tolicy end

for public good,

may be

in part,

and as carriers of persons they

considered as acting in

and being creatures

a public

cai acity,

of' the law they are held to a

strict degree of care for the safety of the lives

and limbs of those whom they carry.

The liability

of a carrier of passengers is

imposed by law, and

requires him to use the utmost care and foresight
for the snfety of his passengers,

and holds him li-

able for the slightest neglect, and for like rea-

sons the same extreme care is required though the
passenger be carried gratuitously; having undertaken to carry a person, the obligation arises to carry safely and properly, even in the case of gratu-

itous passengers.

The case of Gillen'rater vs. M & I. R:-.
5 Ind., 53,

Co.,

where Gillenwater was injured,while

riding on the cars of the defendant, through the

negligence of its agents.

The company was held

liable notwithstanding the fact that he paid no

fare.

Tt seems that he was employed by the rail-

road company to frame and build a bridge on their

road across a creek, and while so employed the corn-

pany directed him to proceed on their cars to

Greenwood, and assist in loading timbers for the

bridge;

that

:.hile

thus on their

cars as directed

the defendants so carelessly managed the same that

they were thrown off the track down a bank, by

means of which his right hand was so badly injured

as to disable him from pursuing his business.

was held that

Tt

it made no difference that Gillenwa-

ter was travelinf

on the road, at the time paying

no fare, and that the company was liable to him as

a passenger and stranger.

Applying the rule that

railroad carriers

are

responsible to

passen-

ge s to the utmost care of very cautious persons,

it follows that they are liable in every case of

injury to a passenger, if he is la:fully on their

cars, whether he has paid fare or not.

If

a per-

son is a trespasser on the cars and is injured the

carrier is not liable to him, as there is no under.

taking on the part of the

carrier

person,

on an-:

carrier.

and he could not,

There

is

a dut'. that

towards such a

grounds,

hold the

the carrier

owes

the passenger on his own account, and also oi the

account of his safety as a citizen of thie state.

The latter is a consideration of public polic

growing out of the interest which a state or gov-

eminent has in protecting the lives and limbs of

its sr biects.

And so far as the consideration of

public policy is concerned, it

cannot be overriden

by any stipulation of the parties to the contract

of

)assenger carriage, since it

is above all other

considerations from its nature;

and no stipulation

of the parties

it,

whether

should be allowed to modify or vary

the case is

one of passenger for hire

or merely a gratuitous passenger, the interest of

the state is the same in both.

The more rigid the rule as to the duty and li7

ability of the carrier, and the more strictly en-

forced, the greater will be the care exercised by

the carrier towards his passengers.

It

is

true

that common carriers of passengers are not insi-ir-

er's of the safety of passengers, as they arc in

the case of goods which they carry;

but principles

of law which forbid their being allowed to exempt

themselves from the consequence of their neyli-

gence in respect to goo4s applies : ith still great-

The Common

er force in the case of passengers.

law had a great regard for human life,

and for this

rerson it exacted a greater degree of carte in re-

spect

ter

to it

than in

of Property.

mere

relation

(Shearman

to any

and Redfield

other mat-

on 7egli-

gence).

In

Appeals,

New York

three

it

has been held,

judges dissenting,

by the Court of

that a common

carrier can, in considc-attion of an abatement in

whole or in

contract

part of his legal fare,

lawfully

'vith a passenger that the latter

upon himself the risk of damage

agents and servants,

for wich

otherwise be liable.

will take

from negligence

t':e carrier

of

would

In this case Bissell ;vas a

drover and made a contract with the defendants

which recited thet,

in consideration thct defend-

ants would convey the stock at viat was termed re-

duced rates, the plaintiff to assiune the risks of

the journey, and all risks of injury to the stock.

The ticket also contained a notice that the owner

of stock receiving this

ticket assumes all risks

for injuries, whether prom negligence of defend-

ants' servants or otherw'ise.

(25 7". Y.,9

442).

Tt

stete,

is well settled that, a carrier Yiy

by special

in this

contraIct, exempt himself from all

liability, but that of the directors or managers

themselves,

and it

will be sustained by the courts.

The weight of authority in this country is

against such contracts.

The courts of this

state

for a long time resisted the attempts of comnon

carriers to limit their common law liability and,

at first, only allowed them to do so for the pur-

pose of obtaining a disclosure in the case of goods

that were subject to extra hazard and risk.

now this

liability

is

changed,

and the

carrier

as imposed by law to almost

that can be conceived.

But

can limit his

any extent

Whether it was wise on the part of the courts

i

uphold!%g such contracts is a matter of dispute.

It can be said that a person who enters into such

a contract should be bound b- the terms it imnposes,

and should not, in case a loss occurs to him, or if

he

is in'ured, bring action to recover ,P]at he has

expressly contracted away, but in all cases where a

contract is made between a drover and a carrier

they do not stand on equal footing and it may be

presumed that the carrier has made the contract all

in his favor, and for that reason it -iould seem but

just that he should still be liable for certain

acts and not be allo-aed under any circumstances to

escape

them.

There has been an attempt to hold a carrier

of passengers liable for injuries to a free passen-

ger, on]y when such injuries arise from gross neg-

ligence, but it

is now p-'etty well settl, O that it

makes no difference whether the injury be caused by

slight or gross negligence that the carrier is li-

able for both, and the only exception is whether

the person injured was lawfully? on the cars at the

time the injury occurred, and if the person injiired

was a trespasser the carrier is not liable.

3 Mont, 90, holds that a carrier of passengers is

bound to exercise only ordinary care toward tres-

passers.

The effect of a contract whereby a carrier

of passengers attempts to avoid his liability for

negligence, and this most frequently arises in cas-

es where persons are traveling on free passes, and

on which are printed conditions that the person

useing the 1jass assumes all risk, and that the

carrier be released from all negli'ence.

case of Wells vs. N. Y. C. Ry. Co.,

Tn the

24 N. Y.,

it

was held that a person accepting a free ticket was

bound by its terms and that such a contract is val-

id.

This was decided by a divided court and this

case has been widely commented on and criticized

and it is thought by many courts and writers on

this subject

that the dissenting opinion by Suth-

erland, J. is founded on the better reasoning.

It is certainly in harmony with the iweight of au-

thority

and also consistent witlh public polic.'.

Sutherland, J.,

who dissented holds a contract ex-

empting a carrier from all liability to be against

public policy, and therefore void.

He enquires:

"And is it not plain that any contract which may

induce or lead, or tend to

induce or lend to a re-

, lay.,
laxation.,of the care and attention required b.,

as a social duty for the preservation of human life

interferes with this public policy,

and should be

held void as against the laws declaring it."

And

his views are based on the ground that rrilroad

companies are,

in a certain sense, public offic-

ials, and the rule binding them to great care 1.as

not established only for the benefit of the party

injured, but also for the benefit of the entire

public, "and that a passenger cannot, by any con-

tract in advance of the injury, lay aside his in-

dividual benefit

itr."1

from the law or rrle of liabil-

And this was followed in Perkins vs.

the

sane company, aWd the further princille that the

negligence from which the carrier could exempt it-

self wzs that of i-,s agents or employees, but it

could not exempt itself from the negligence of its

directors or managers, as they may be considered

the corporation itself, and negligence on their

part would be a breach of duty which the company

owes to the public.

And Smith, J.,

said: "Ser- .r';

vants or agents mean conductors, engineers, brake-

19
men, bag,'agemen, switch tenders and so on."

Thus as far as the la, is concerned

in this

state it is well settled; and a carrier can exempt

itself from all liability, except that

'risin, from

the culpable negligence of its directors or manag-

ers.

And, notwithstanding that the United States

Supreme Court has established and firmly maintains

a different rule, the courts in this state stand

firmly by their former decisions, and in 71 N. Y.,

180, Maynard vs. Syracuse Railroad Company, it was

held that the ruile laid down by the United States

Supreme Court to the contrary did not modify or

relax the rule in this state, and that the common

carrier may make special contracts to the extent

of enabling it to exonerate itself frorn the effects

of even gross negligence.

We will now consider the rule as applied in

some other states as affecting a carrier's right to

limit his liability.

derson, 51 Pa. St.,

court that

In Penn. Ry. Co.

vs. Hen-

315, it was held by the Supreme

a contract

for exenption from all

bility for negligence was void,

lia-

as being against

the policy of the law-

Tt appeared in this case that Hendei'son, on

the trip on which he was

illed, shipped some live-

stock to Philadelphia and received a drover's pass,

being a ticket given to the person in charge of the

stock, thei-e being no charge for the ticket, and

the freight being the same whether any person went

with the stock or not.

On this ticket was the

following endorsement:

"The person accepting this

free ticket assumes all risk of accidents and ex-

pressly agrees that the compl any shall not be liable

under any circiustances, wetvhet1er of negligence by

its ag-nts or otherwise for any injury to the per-

son or for the property of the part\, using this

ticket.

"

Rut, notwithstanding this contract, the

company was held liable.

The courts of Pennsylvania have never been led

away from the Common law liability

of the

carrier,

and while they criticize the rule laid down and

followed in this state, they still maintain and

hold that all contracts that release the carrier

from all liability are void.

Carriers in that

state are held to a strict account for the safety

of the lives of their passengers, and the rule is

rigidly enforced without any relaxation even in the

case of contract allowing them to throw off their

liability.

And even supposing that a carrier can,

by special contract, exempt itself from other ex-

emptions than those allowed by law,

still such con-

tracts ought not to be allowed to release them from

the consequences of gross negligence, as gross neg-

ligence on the part of a carrier of passengers

should be looked upon as a crime, at least he is

bound in emjloying agents to

select only careful

and skillful

men;

and in

view of the many accidents

that happen in these days of railroad travel,

in-

stead of relaxing the rules of law relating to the

common carrier of passengers, they should be drawn

around them with a still stronger hand than they

have been in times past.

As said by Davis, J.,

in

the case of Stinison vs. New York Central Railroad

Company, 32 IT. Y.,

335,

"The fruits of the rule El-

lowing carriers to release themselves from liabil-

ity are already being gathered in increasing acci-

dents through decreasing care and vigilance on the

part of the corporations, and they will be contin-

ued to be reaped untila just sense of public policy

shall lead to legislative restriction upon power

to make this kind of contracts."

Now take the case of contracts between a dro-

ver and a carrier where the carrier states that in

consideration

of carrying

t.-

cattle

at reduced

rates, and giving the drover a free ticket, that

he thereby assi)rnes all risks from whatever cause

arising.

The statements usually made by a car-

rier in such cases are purely fictitious and he

does not really carry at reduced rates, he only

takes this way of evading his liability.

It

is absolutely necessary in carrying stock

that the person ,ho has charge of them should

carried by the company so he

stock, and the price

be

can take care of the

paid fo-

the stock, or

freight on the stock, includes the cost of trans-

porting the drover,

stock, who is not,

ger,

or the person accompaning

therefor!,

but a paying one,

the

a gratuitors passen-

and t*!e word f'ree is,

there-

fore, only true so far as that the conductor of the

particular train on which he ',ravels is

not entit-

led to charge him separately for his passage.

This is the rule followedl in the United States

Suprewe Court,

Lockwood,

was

in

the case of Railroad Company vs.

17 Wallace,

injured while

357j.

Lockwood,

a drover,

traveling on a stock train

from

Buffalo to Albany, and brought action to recover

d.--iges

for the

injury.

He had cattle

on the

train, and had been required, at Buffalo,

to sign

an agreement to attend to the loading,

ing and unloading of them,

injury to them,

transport-

and to take all

risk of

and of personal injury to himself,

or to whomsoever went with the ca-tle; and he re-

ceived what is called a drover's

pass, that is, a

pass certifying that he had shipped sufficient

stock to pass free to Albany, but declaring that

the acceptance of the pass was to be considered

a waiver of all claims for damages or injuries re-

ceived on the journey.

The agreemnet stated its

consideration to be the carrying of the plaintiff's

cattle

at less tlian regular rates

was shown that these

the ordinary rates

rates

charged,

charged,

were aboit three

but it

times

and that no drover had

cattle carried on t'ose terms but that signed sim-

ilar agreements to that signed by Lockwood, and re-

ceived si'j4lar

passes.

It -,as held by the court that

passenger

exempt

for hire,

and that the company

itself from its liability.

might have been different

Lockwood wYis

Lockwood was a

could not

The result

had the court found that

a free passenger,

but as to this

it

was not even hinted how they would have decided had

this been the case.

But it was said that it vwas

against the plicy of the la,- to allo-r stii~ulations

which will relieve

the company fror- the exercise of

that care and diligence that is

for the performance

of their

i!nposed upon them

duty.

,.e have al-

ready seen that this is contrary to the rule in

this state, as here a drover is held to be a free

passenge,

from a11.

and that a

liability

carrier

can release himself

to such drover.

Mhile t;ie

courts of -,his state are not boind to follow the

decisions of the Federal

be better

if

thiey would do so,

they could consistently,

and policy, do

In

Court,

England

it

and

would perhaps

it

seems that

with reas, ns of principle

so.

it

is

now settled that a comnon car-

rier may, by s-pecial contract, exempt itself from

all

narn,

liability,

whether arisin,

or gross negligence.

vs. Furners Ry. Co.,

frota slight,

ordi-

The case of !AcCowley

8 Queen's Bench, 57, where a

drover was carried under a pass, one of the condi-

tions of w;'ich was,

his own risk.

that 'IcCawley

And it

was to

!hi

was held that

travel at

exempt-

ed the company from all liability for injuries to

him, wether caused by slight or gross negligence,

and also where a pe,-son takes his o -n risk, it

makes no difference as to the degree of negligence

whereby he was injured.

The English cases are

decided on the ground that a

drover is

a free pas-

senger, and that the carrier can, in consideration

of friee transportation, limit his liability for in-

juries to such passenger.

This is,

Jiowever,

con-

trary to the earlier decisions, and it was formerly

held that a condition that the owJner sho!,ld under-

take all

risk

of conveyance

'zas unreasonable,

be-

cause

it protecLed the company from the conse-

quences of injury, though caused b, their own mis-

conduct.

So we see that in England the law has grad-

ually changed till

sult

it

has naiv -eached the

same re-

that has been given such contracts in this

state, with the exception of gross negligence, and

it

is

doubtful

if

riile to be th's

our courts will

ve"

alo.r

the

appliod.

As a check on carriers limiting their liabil-

ity, Parliament,

Railway

in 1854, passed an act called the

and Canal Traffic Act,

way and canal companies

declaring that rail.

should be liable

for the

negligence of themselves or t!,eir servants, not-

withstanding any notice or conditions, unless the

court or judge trying the cause should adjudge the

conditions jilst and reasonable.

This statute practically brought the law

back to its original standing, and thus the law

stands at

the present time

in regard to contracts

between carrier and passenger, and the only limi-

tation is that the court shall,

in all cases of

contract where the carrier seeks to avoid his li-

ability for injuries, say whether the contract is

just and reasonable.

We have

in this country three different doc-

trines in regard to degree of care required to

be exercised by the carrier towards gratuito-1s pas-

sengers.

That of the United States Supreme Court,

holding all contracts

all liability void.

that exempt the carrier from

The rule

followed in

Penn-

sylvania, allowing the carrier to limit his liabil-

ity to some extent but not for ,-ross negligence.

And the radical rule laid down and pushed along in

this state by the aid of the courts.

For New York

certainly stands alone and has the honorl(if such

it may be called) of allowing greater latitude to

contracts exempting the carrier from all liabil-

ity for negligence than any othor state.

The law can only be brouarht back to

inal standing by legislative enactment;

its

and

orig-

ve

hope to see the duty of conmon carriers of passen-

gers, whether

hey be gratuitous or paying passen-

gers, rigidly enforced, and such laws enacted as

will tend to lessen the number of accidents that

are ca7'sed by negligence and indifference on the

part of railroad companies.

It is difficult to perceive , however,

why

some courts hold that a free passenger may contract

that he shall make no claim for damages incurred by

the negligence of the servants of the carrier.

Public policy forbids such contracts, and it should

not be considered whether the service is gratui-

tous or not.

Men owe duties to their fellow men, and those

duties cannot be released by contract in any case,

whether the passenger has or has not paid fare.

Some courts, however, content themselves with

stoping at the point of gross negligence, and re-

fuse to allow a carrier to exempt himself from its

effects (Ill. Cent. Ry. Co.

vs. Read, 37 Ill.,484).

Read while traveling in the cars of defendant com-

pany, received injuries to his person occasioned by

a collision of trains.

At the time of the acci-

dent he was traveling under a free pass given him

by the company upon which wEre the usual printed

conditions contained on free passes exempting the

company from all liability for injuries.

It was held that this might exempt them for

negligence that had the character of recklessness,

but not from gross negligence.

Is not the whole business coi-mnunity affected

by holding contracts that relieve the carrier from

all liability valid.

The business

of transporta-

tion is mostly concentrated in a few pow:erful cor-

porations,

as suit

and they control

them,

they choose

and make such contracts

with such conditions upon travel as

and the public are bound to accept.

Contracts of common carriers,

like those of

persons occupying a fiduciary capacity,

are given

a position in which they can take undue advantal-e

of the persons with whom they contract;

and for

these reasons, all contracts that exempt the

car-

rier from that duty which he sho ld exercise from

the nature of his calling, should be hold void as

an userpation of power that is

by his

conferred on him

charter.

Concludig, therefore,

contracts between

upheld as valid,

carrier

that all

that there are certain

and Passenger

contracts

that will be

that stipulate

for exemption from negligence, whatever be its de-

gree, are repugnant to the law and also contrary

to public policy.

In

regulating the public establishment of com-

mon carriers,

the groat object of the law '&ss to

secure the utmost care and diligence in the per-

formance of their

important

duties that

sary to every advanced communit-y.

are neces-

And in looking

at the great advancement that has been made in

means of travel,

and the danger to be encountered

in

jorrney from fear of accidents

undertaking a

caused in many cases from careless agents, one can-

not but think that the rigid rules of law that were

first applied to co.mon carriers has becomc a

thing of the past.

